ryan 2025-03-24 03:21 a.m.Minute Order
The Court construed the motion as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mayfl. R. Civ. P. 13(b)(6). In doing so, the Court considered whether the immunity doctrine espoused in Harlow, but codified in 5 M.S.C. 1 § 3212.2(a-c) means that, the facts being taken as true, the Plaintiff has not stated a cause of action upon which this Court can grant relief. This Court, however, is not convinced that the Defendant is entitled to immunity solely based on the facts within the civil complaint. Specifically, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's right to be secure in their person and the Plaintiff's right to fly in public air space to have been violated (count 1/2, respectively). For the former, the Court weighed the expected right of the Plaintiff versus the Government's need to maintain security and safety of their military institutions. The Court finds that because the Defendant was in public airspace, their right to remain secure outweighs any potential security risks. This decision was not made solely on the scope of the law, but it was a factor, given that our statutes can influence the scope of the Plaintiff's right to be secure. The latter right is implicit in the ability of every aviator to travel freely in public airspace. Because the Defendant, based on the complaint, abridged the Plaintiff's ability to move without legal authority or justification to do so. Given the training given to members of the military, it can be presumed that a reasonable person would have either not exercised the Defendant's level of force or would have known such force to be unlawful.
Thus, based on the complaint, the Defendant is NOT entitled to immunity. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5), filed on the 18th of March, 2025, is denied.
So ordered this 24th of March, 2025,
H. R. Ryan
District Judge